1. INTRODUCTION Pascal in his Pens&s makes the following remarkable observation:
Our soul is tossed into the body where it finds number, time, dimensions. It argues about them, calls them nature or necessity, and cannot believe in anything else. . . . Let us consider the point and say: 'Either God exists, or he does not exist.' But which of the alternatives shall we choose ? Reason can determine nothing: there is an infinite chaos which divides us. A coin is being spun at the extreme point of this infinite distance which will turn up heads or tails. What is your bet ? If you rely on reason you cannot settle for either, or defend either position.
Do not therefore accuse those who have made their choice of falseness because you know nothing about it. 'No, I do not blame them for their choice, but for making a choice at all because he who calls heads and he who calls tails are guilty of the same mistake, they are both wrong:
the right course is not to wager.' 'Yes, but we have to wager. You are not a free agent; you are committed. Which will you have then ? Come on. Since you are obliged to choose, let us see which interests you least. You may lose two things: the true and the good; and there are two things that you stake: your reason and your will, your knowledge and your beatitude;
and your nature has two things from which to escape: error and unhappiness.
Your reason is not more deeply wounded by choosing one rather than the other because it is bound to choose. That disposes of one point. But what about your beatitude ? Let us measure the gain and the loss by saying: "Heads God exists." Let us compare the two cases; if you win, you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Don't hesitate then. Take a bet that he exists.' 'That's fine. Yes, I must take a bet; but perhaps I am staking too much.' 'Come. Since there is an equal chance of gain and loss, if you were only to win two lives for one, you could still wager; but if there were three to be won, you would have to gamble (since you are bound to gamble), and it would be imprudent, when you are obliged to gamble, not to risk your life in order to win three lives at a game in which there is such a chance of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness at stake. And since it is so, if there were an infinite number of chances of which only one was for you, you would still be right to risk one to win two; and you would be taking the wrong road if, being forced to gamble, you refuse to stake one life against three in a game in which, out of an infinite number of chances, one is for you, if the prize were in infinity of life which was infinitely happy. But in this game you can win eternal life which is eternally happy; you have one chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what you are staking is finite. That settles it: wherever there is infinity, and where there is not an infinity of chances of losing against the chance of winning, there is no room for hesitation: you must stake everything. And so, since you are forced to gamble, you must abandon reason in order to save your life, rather than risk it for the infinite gain which is just as likely to turn up as the loss of nothing. ' Pascal [1670], pp. 200-203. In modern terms,
Pascal is presenting a version of qualitative expected utility. Basically, he is saying that a rational man M has a preference ordering 2 for certain types of gambles. These gambles are of the form a A b where A is some chance event (e.g., heads occurring when a coin is flipped) and Q, b are objects whose value to M are independent of the occurrence or nonoccurrence of A, and "a A b" means that M gets a if A occurs and b if A does not occur. Furthermore, it is implicit in the above passage that M has a probability function P on chance events and an utility function v on objects of value such that a A b 2 c B d iff v(u)P(A) + @)(I -P(A)) > v(c)P(B) + ~(d)(l -P(B)).
In the above passage Pascal allows some of the objects to have infinite utility and some of the chance events infinitesimal probability. In 17th Century mathematics (Pascal died in 1662), the use of infinities and infinitesimals in proofs of mathematical or physical propositions were common.
In Pascal's time (as well as today) measurement was not well understood and there was constant confusion between quantitative and qualitative concepts. For example, Pascal implicitly assumes that an infinity of happiness should (to a rational man) have infinite utility. This would be reasonable if the "additivity" of happiness corresponded to the additivity of the utility of happiness. If one were only considering happiness, then it is consistent to assume that such a correspondence always exists provided that the operation of "additivity" of happiness satisfies certain natural conditions. However, Pascal compares chances of happinesses. Probability is the measure of chance and chance has its own form of "additivity":
if A and B are disjoint events then A u B can be considered as the "sum" of A and B. Once again, if one were only considering chance LOUIS NARENS by itself, then it is consistent to assume that the "additivity" of chance corresponds to the additivity of probabilities. However, if one has to simultaneously measure chance and happiness to measure the values of chances of happinesses, then only in special cases can this be done in a way such that the "additivity" of chance corresponds to the additivity of probabilities and the "additivity" of happiness corresponds to the additivity of the utility of happiness.
It turns out that a similar situation occurs in physics where there are natural ways of qualitatively defining an ordering relation >, and an "addition" operation o on the set of speeds S so that (S, 2, o) is a closed extensive structure (see Definition 3.6) and thus has an additive numerical representation: i.e., there is a real valued function s defined on S such that for all x, y in S, and x 2 y ifi 44 > s(y),
Similarly, natural qualitative ordering relations k', 2" and qualitative "addition" operations o', 0" can be defined on the set of lengths L and the set of times T so that (L, k', 0') and (T, k", 0") are closed extensive structures and also have additive numerical representations. In relativistic physics there is a bit of a problem with the speed of light 2. Ifs is an additive numerical representation for speed and x is a speed such that 1> x, then in special relativity E> x 0 x. Thus s(Z) > s(x) + s(x) = 2s(x). Applying this reasoning to x 0 x, it follows that s(Z) > 4s(x). In general, for each positive integer n, s(Z) > 2?(x). Thus in relativity ifs is an additive numerical representation for speed, then s(Z) = co. Interestingly enough, if 1 > x and x is qualitatively "added" to L then the result is qualitatively equivalent to I, i.e., x 0 Z N 1. Pascal in the above mediation gives his "infinities" a similar property: Unity joined to infinity does not add anything to it, any more than a foot to a measure which is infinite.
The finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite, and becomes pure nothingness.
Although the speed of light cannot be exceeded in relativistic physics, it is theoretically surpassable in classical physics. In classical physics there are additive numerical representations, d, t, s, for distance, time, and speed respectively such that the representation of the speed of a particle in uniform motion is the ratio of the representation of the length travelled to the representation of the time elapsed, i.e., s = d/t. In special relativity, one cannot simultaneously have additive numerical representations d, t, s for length, time and speed (even when s is only defined for speeds less than 1) such that s = d/t. Therefore, in relativistic physics some nonadditive numerical representation must be given or law s = d/t must be changed. Historically, physicists have chosen to preserve the law s = d/t and give additive representations to length and time and a nonadditive representation to speed so that for all speeds X, y,
+ S(Y)
s(x a y, = 1 + S(X) s(y) where units are chosen so that s(l) = 1. If we let @ be the binary operation defined on the positive real numbers by then in relativistic physics for all speeds X, y, and X&Y iff 44 3 s(y),
In this case s is a numerical representation for (S, 2, o) and the qualitative "addition" operation on speeds is interpreted quantitively as the numerical operation 0. (For qualitative treatments of relativistic velocities, see Lute and Narens [1975] and Narens and Lute [ 19751) . In order to create an analogous situation for Pascal's example, let d be an algebra of chance events, %? be a set of objects of value, and for each a E @ and A E d let (a, A) mean that a rational man M will receive u if A occurs and receive nothing if A does not occur. Let 2 be M's preference ordering on g Intuitively, 'p is M's utility function for %?, P is M's subjective measure of the likelihood of the occurrence of members of 8, @ is the quantitative interpretation of the qualitative "addition" operation for chance, and () is the quantitative interpretation of M's expectation function. Note that if @ is + then from (1), (3), and (5) it follows that P is an (additive) probability function on 6. Thus if % has a representation where @ is + then the chance events in E have the qualitative structure of a probability space. If (3 is multiplication, ., then v(u) . P(A) looks like the usual expectation for (a, 4. In Section 2, axioms are given that guarantee that @ has a unique (up to a choice of units) distributive representation. There are, however, reasonable axioms for % that yield no distributive representations. In analogy with relativistic physics, in these axiomatizations either chance must be given a nonadditive representation or the usual law for computing expectations must be abandoned.
In our analogy, the speed of light corresponds to Pascal's infinity of happiness. In relativity, the speed of light, 1, is assigned a finite numerical value. It is natural to ask what qualitative condition forces 1 to be assigned a$nite value. The answer is that in relativity distance (length) is given an additive representation and because of the law s = d/t, speed can be measured in terms of the distance travelled in unit time. This allows the following qualitative boundedness principle for relativistic speed to be formulated:
There is a speed x such that for all speeds y, twice the distance that a particle with speed x travels in one second is greater than the distance a particle with speed y travels in one second. Naturally, the numerical value that is assigned to a speed z is the numerical value of the distance that a particle with speed a covers in one second. Note that the speed of light plays no essential role in the boundedness of speed since if one were to restrict relativity to speeds less than I then the above principle would still force the set of numerical values assigned to speeds to be a bounded set. If we consider chance acting like distance and utility like speed, then the following would be an analogous definition of boundedness for @:
There is an x in g such that for all y in %7, (x, X) > (y, A) where X is the sure event, and A is some event such that (y, A) N (y, X -A).
In Section 2, axioms are given that for bounded @ yield an unique (up to a choice of units) additive representation. However, such a representation is not multiplicative unless a certain qualitative condition called distributivity is satisfied. Another way of dealing with infinite quantities is to measure them in structures that are generalizations of the real number system. This is done in Section 2 where value and chance are measured in a generalization of the reals that look like a lexicographic ordering.
The proofs of the theorems in Section 2 are given in Section 3.
UTILITY-UNCERTAINTY
TRADE-OFF STRUCTURES DEFINITION 2.1. (X, 8, W, 2) is said to be a utility-uncertainty trade-ofl structure if and only if o 6 8' and 8 u ( a} is an algebra of subsets of some nonempty set X, V is a nonempty set, and 2 is a binary relation on V x d such that the following four axioms hold:
Ax.1. weak order: 2 is a weak order; Ax.2. independence: (i) for all A, B in 8, if for some x E V, (x, A) 2 (x, B), then for ally E g, (y, 4 Z (Y, B); and (ii) for all u, v in V, if for some
Ax.3. trade-ofJ: (i) for all x,y E %?, if (x, X) 2 (y, X) then for some E E 6, (x, E) .w (y, X); and (ii) for all A in d and for all u in V there is a z in V such that (u, A) -(z, -0 Ax.4. uncertainty: for some x E %? the following three conditions hold for all A, B, C, D in 8:
, and E > F.
In Definition 2.1, the null event, a, is excluded from consideration for convenience. As before, (x, A) should be interpreted as receiving object x if event A occurs and receiving nothing if A does not occur. Ax.2 says that the values of objects are not influenced by the occurence of events and that the occurence of events are not influenced by the values of objects. Ax.4 are some of Lute's axioms for qualitative probability (Lute, 1967) . Although Ax.3 and Ax.4 can be greatly weakened, I have decided to use them since they are easy to state and allow elementary proofs of most of the theorems that follow. , 2) be an Archimedean utility-uncertainty trade-off structure. Then 4 is said to have an unique additive representation if and only if % has an additive representation and for all additive representations (0, p, P), (o', tp', P') for @, q7 = q~', P = P' and for all XE@ and AE&', v(x) 
be an Archimedean utility-uncertainty trade-off structure. Then the following two propositions are true:
(1) if Of? has a maximal element then S has an unique additive representation; be an Archimedean, distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure. A distributive representation for % is an ordered 3-tuple (v, P, u) such that q~ is a function from 9 into the positive reals, P: 8 -+ (0, 11, u is an element of V, and the following three conditions hold for all x, y in V and all A, B in 8:
. P(B);
(3) if A n B = o then P(A u B) = P(A) + P(B). (1) Q(X) =9w = 1, Let @ = (X, 8, %, 2> b e a distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure that is not necessarily Archimedean.
Intuitively, a representation for S is based upon a generalization of the idea of a lexicographic ordering. Basically, the elements of $7 are divided into dimensions or commeasurability classes. Two elements in the same commeasurability ciass can be measured with respect to one another, i.e., if some element e of a cornmeasurability class S? is chosen as a unit, then there is essentially only one way of assigning real numbers to members of x so that e is assigned the number 1. Commeasurability classes are ordered as follows: x1 is greater than Z, if and only if for some x in %, and some y in ~5, , (x, X) > (y, X). As in lexicographic orderings, elements of different cornmeasurability classes are ordered only in terms of the cornmeasurability classes to which they belong and not by their position in their cornmeasurability class. The elements of G are divided into two sets: (i) those that can be measured with respect to X (the noninfkitesimal elements) and (ii) those that are too small to be measured with respect to X (the infinitesimal elements). DEFINITION 2.11. Let % = (X, 8, V, 2) be a distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure.
1. For all x, y in %', x is said to be cornmeasurable with y (in symbols, x = y) if and only if (1) for some A in 8, (x, X) N (y, A) and there is no infinite fundamental sequence with respect to A, or (2) f or some B in 6, (y, X) N (x, B) and there is no infinite fundamental sequence with respect to B. It is easy to show that = is an equivalence relation on %7. Call each equivalence class determined by = a commeasurability class.
2. Let A be an arbitrary element of 8. A is said to be injinitesimal if and only if there is an infinite fundamental sequence with respect to A. A is said to be nonin$nitesimal if and only if A is not infinitesimal.
It is easy to show that (i) X is noninfinitesimal, (ii) if A, B are infinitesimal then A u B is infinitesimal, and (iii) if C is noninfinitesimal and D is an arbitrary member of d then C u D is noninfinitesimal. DEFINITION 2.12. Let %'J = (X, 8, %', 2) be a distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure and let 9 be the set of noninfinitesimal members of 8. A representa-tion for @ is an ordered 3-tuple (v, P, F) such that pl is a function from %Y into the positive reals, P is a function from 8 into (0, I], 9 C %', and for each x, y in V and each A, B in 9 the following eight conditions hold:
(1) for some 24 in F, u = x;
(2) ifx,yareinFandx+ythenx+y; In what follows fAz will denote the simple gamble of receiving x if the event A occurs and receiving nothing if A does not occur. That is, the notation fAe will replace the previous notation (x, A). Consequently, previous definitions (e.g., fundamental sequence) and axioms (e.g., Archimedean, independence) equally well apply in this new notation. DEFINITION 2.13. Let V and X be nonempty sets, G be a set such that @ $ d and & u { ia} is an algebra of subsets of X, 9 be a set of functions from members of d into V such that each g in 9 takes on only finitely many values in '+?, x1 ,..., x, , and for i = I,..., n, g-l(xJ is in 8, and let 2' be a binary relation on 9. Then (X, 8, @?, 9, 2') is said to be a gambling structure if and only if the following six axioms hold: is an Archimedean, distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure.
DEFINITION 2.14. Let d be a set such that is # 6 and &' u (D} is an algebra of subsets of some nonempty set X. Let P be an additive probability function on 8, i.e., P be a function from & into (0, l] such that P(X) = I and for all A, B in 6, if A n B = o then P(A u B) = P(A) + P(B). Let C be in 8 and let h be a function from C into the positive reals that has as values rl ,..., Y, . For i = i,..., n, let A, = (x 1 h(x) = rj}. Assume Ai is in 6'. Then the expectation of h with respect to P, Ep(h), is defined as follows:
E,(h) = f P(A,) . yi . i=l THEOREM 2.4. Let (X, 8, %, 3, 2'; be a gambling structure and u, v be arbitrary elements of g. Then there is an additive probability function P on & and a function 9 from +? into the positive reals such that v(u) = 1 andfor all f, g in 9,
fk'g ifi W&f 1) 2 JGMgN~ Furthermore, if Q is another additive probability function on 8 and # is another function from $7 into the positive reals such that #(v) = I and for all f, g in 93, then P = Q and 9 = v(v)+.
The above axiom systems can be modified in a very natural way to include the case of utilities having nonpositive values. Convention.
For each x in V and each A in 6 let rr(x, A) be an element y in % such that (x, A) N (y, X). (By trade-o#rr exists.) LEMMA 3.11. If % is Archimedean then there is an unique probability representation for <x7 G', x2>.
Proof. Let x be a fixed element of %. By Lemma 3.10, let 93 be the unique extensive representation for ('Z", , 2% &>. Define P on d as follows: for each A in &, P(A) = ~ (v(x, A) ). Then it is easy to verify that P is a probability representation for (X, 8, 2,) .
Suppose that P, Q are two probability representations for (X, Proof. Existence. By Lemma 3.10 let y be the unique extensive representation for (%?:, , &=, 0,) and P be the unique probability representation for (X, 8, >a>. Define the binary operation 0 on (0, l] x (0, l] as o f 11 ows: if for some y in V and some A in 8 r = v(y) and s = P(A) then r 0 s = v(r(y, A)), otherwise Y 0 s is some arbitrary member of (0, 11. T o s h ow that (0, cp, P) is an additive representation for % it is only necessary to verify conditions 1 to 4 of Definition 2.6. Let u, v be arbitrary members of V and B, C be arbitrary members of &. Then: 1. P(X) = 1 since P is a probability representation for (X, 8, 2,) . If z is a maximal element of %, then z -* x and thus v(z) = v(x) = 1.
2. Since n(u, X) -$ u, 9)(+4 X)) = y(u) 0 P(X) = @).
If z is a maximal element of %F then x -a x and thus PWG B)) = d+, 4) = P(B). Therefore, P is a probability representation for (X, b, 2s) . Similarly, Q is also a probability representation for (X, 8, 2,) . Since by Lemma 3.11 (X, 8, 2,) has only one probability representation, P = Q. Let u be an arbitrary element of V. By trade-of, let E be such that (x, E) N (u, X). Then F(U) = y(u) 0 P(X) = F(X) 0 P(E) = P(E). Similarly, #(u) = Q(E). Since P = Q, p = #.
Let z, be an arbitrary member of V and F be an arbitrary member of 8. By trade-of let G be such that (v, F) 
1 LEMMA 3.13. Suppose that P is a probability representation for (X, 8, 2,) and A ,,...,Ai,...isasequenceofmembersofdsuchthatforeuchi,A,~AAi+,.Th~foreach A in 6, P(A) = supAtzB P(B).
Proof.
We will first show that lirni--P(Ai --AiT1) == 0. Assume that for some positive real Y there are infinitely many i such that P(A, -Aj+l) > Y. Since P(A,) > P(A, -A,) = P( (A, -A,) u (A, -A3) = P(Ei -F<) + P(Fi).
Since for each i LEMMA 3.14. Suppose that % is bounded and Archimedean, xi is a sequence of members of %' such that xi -+ 00, and Ai is a sequence of members of & such that Ai 3 Ai+l . Then there is an unique additive representation for %.
Proof.
Existence. By Lemma 3.11, let P be the unique probability representation for (X, 8, &) . By Lemma 3.12, for each positive integer i, let ( oi , CJJ$ , Pi) be the unique representation for (X, 8, ezi, ki) where ki is the restriction of 2 to %Yz. >: 8. Since for each i ksi = & , it follows that Pi = P. Let x be an arbitrary membe; of 55. Since xi + co, xi >r x for all but finitely many positive integers i. Without loss of generality, suppose that for all i, xi >1 X. We will first show that limi+m pi(x) exists and is positive. By boundedness, let A in d be such that for ally in V, (x, X) 2 (y, A). By trade-of, let Ai be such that (xi , AJ N (x, X). S ince xi -+ cc and xi >1 x, by trade-08 and independence, Ai >a Ai+, >a A. Therefore the sequence P(A,) is monotonically decreasing and bounded from below by P(A). Thus limiem P(A,) exists and is positive. But since vi(x) = ~&rr(x~ , AJ) = P,(A,) = P(A,), it follows that lim,,, vi(x) = lirnCqm P(A,) > 0. Thus for each x in V let v(x) = lim,,, vi(x).
1. Since P is a probability representation for (X, 8, &), P(X) = 1. Suppose that yi -+ co. Then for each positive integer i, there are ji , k, such that xj, > 1 yki > 1 Xi. Thus lim,+, q(xJ = lim,,, q(yi). Since &xj) < I for all i > j, v(xj) = i$$ Vi(xj) < 1.
Since the sequence ~JI(x~) is increasing and bounded by 1, limj,, q(xi) exists and is < 1. We will show that Km,,, v(xJ = 1. Let B be an arbitrary member of d such that X >2 B. By boundedness, let n be a positive integer such that for all y in '$7 (x, , W Z (~9 B). Th us f or each positive integer j > n, &x,) > vj(r(xj , B)) = P(B). Thus, Therefore, Since B is an arbitrary member of d such that X >2 B, by Lemma 3.13, ;i~: cp(xj) 3 sup P(B) = P(X) = 1.
x >2R Therefore, 2. Let 0 be a binary operation on (0, l] defined by: for each x in %? and each A in 8, if Y = p)(x) and s = P(A) then Y 0 s = v(n(x, A)), otherwise let Y 0 s be an arbitrary member of (0, 11. Then for each x in '?Z, q(x) 0 P(X) = ~(T(x, X)) = q(x). Suppose that yi is a sequence of members of V such that yi -+ co. Let C be an arbitrary element of 8. Then lim,,,[v(yJ 0 P(C)] = lim,,,[q(xi) 0 P(C)] = Emi,,,, pl(rr(x,, C)). Therefore we need only to show that limi+m v (rr(xi , C)) = P(C). Let D be an arbitrary element of d such that C >z D. By boundedness, let z be such that for all y in V, (z, C) 2 (y, D). Let m be such that x, k1 z. Then for all j 3 m, (x,, , C) 2 (xi, D). Therefore, for j > m, f'(C) > fi& vj(+, , '7) = d+, 9 Cl) 3 P(D).
Letting m + co we get P(C) 3 kz dm(xi 7 C)) > P(D)* Since D is an arbitrary element of d such that C >z D, by Lemma 3.13, P(C) 3 fin d+i > Cl) 2 c"",pD P(D) = P(C). It follows that (xm , A,, -D) > (z, X). This contradicts the previously established result that for all B in 6, if Y > P(B) then for all y in 'GY, (z, X) 2 (y, B). Thus we have shown that lim,+a P(A,) = T = q(z). Similarly, lim+, Q(Ai) = 1,4(z). Since P = Q, p(z) = I+(Z). Since z is an arbitrary element of V, 9, = 4. Let u be an arbitrary element of %? and E be an arbitrary element of 8. By trade-ofl let v be such that (u, E) N (v, X). Then q(u) 0 P(E) = dv) 0 P(X) = p)(v). Similarly, (cr(u) 0' Q(E) = #(u). Since P = Q and 9 = 4, d4 0 P(E) = ~44 0' Q(E). I THEOREM 2.1. If % is Archimedean then the following two propositions are ture:
(1) if 43 has a maximal element then S?! has an unique additive representation;
(2) if% is bounded and there exist A, ,..., A, ,... in & such that Ai 3 Ai+l , then fJCY has an unique additive representation.
Proof. Lemmas 3.12 and 3.14. 1 DEFINITION 3.5. Let 9'/ be distributive. Then define the binary operation 0 on V as follows: x@y~ziffx,y,zarein%andforsomeA,BindsuchthatAr\B= 0 and for some II in V, (u, A) N (x, X), (u, B) N (y, X), and (u, A u B) N (z, X).
(Properly speaking, one might call IJ a "multivalued operation." As before, for convenience we will consider x my to be an element of V although it is really an equivalence class of members of g determined by the equivalence relation -.)
LEMMA 3.15. Suppose % is distributive. Then for ail x, y, z, w in V:, if x 0 y -1 z andx 0~y~~wthenz~~w.
PYOO~. Left to reader. By using Lemma 3.16 and Lemmas 3.3 to 3.9, it is easy to establish that (%?, 2t , 0) is an (Archimedean) extensive structure as defined in Krantz, et al [1971] page 84. Thus by Theorem 3 on page 85 of Krantz, et aE [1971] , the following Lemma is true: LEMMA 3.17. Suppose that @ is distributive and Archimedean and that u, v are elements of %. Then there is a function y from 97 into the positive reals such that the following three conditions hold:
(1) y(u) = I; 3. Suppose that % is distributive and 9 is a subset of V such that 9 has exactly one member from each cornmeasurability class of %7. Then there is a representation for % of the form (T, P, 9). Furthermore, if (4, Q, S> is another representa& for 4, then P = Q and for each x in 9 and each y in 9 if x = y then v(x) = v(y) #(x).
Outline of proof. Define the relation N on V as follows: x N y iff x, y E V and either (x, X) -(y, X) or for some infinitesimal A in 8, either (x, X -A) -(y, X) or (x, X) -(y, X -A). Th en it is easy to show that II is an equivalence relation on %?.
Let 5? be the set of noninfinitesimal elements of &. Define the relation z on Y as follows: A g B iff A, I3 E 9 and either A -2 B or for some infinitesimal C in b, either A --C -2 B or A -2 B -C. Then it is easy to show that z is an equivalence relation on 9.
Let 9 be the set of equivalence classes of 64 determined by the E equivalence relation. Let W be the set of N equivalence classes of %Y.
Let M be an arbitrary cornmeasurability class of 55'. Let M' = (a E V 1 a n M # a}. Define >,,, on M' x 2" as follows:
(a, R) khl (b, S) iff a, b EM' and R, SE 3' and for some x in a, y in 6, A in R, B in S, (x, A) >, (y, B).
Let X' be the element R of 9' such that X E R. Define the (partial) operations n, u, -9 on Y' as follows: For each R, S, T in B', (1) RuS= T~~~~~~~~~~AER,BES,CET,AUB-C;
(2) RnS= TiffforsomeAER,BES,CET,AnB-C; (3) R" = S iff for some A E R, B E S, A" -B.
Define the relation R n S = iz~ by: R n S = o iff R, S E 9' and for some A E R, B E S, A n B = ,U . Then in a natural way, 9' with the operations V, n, N looks formally like an algebra of subsets of X' minus the empty set. Under the above interpretations one can verify that for each commeasurability class M of V, (X', 9, M', &) is an Archimedean, distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure. Since 9 contains exactly one member from each cornmeasurability class M of %', let Us be the single member of M n .F. Then by Theorem 2.2, for each commeasurability class M of 'G, let (vM, Prvr, u & be a distributive representation for (X', P', M', krvr). Then as in the proof of Lemma 3.11, it is easy to show that if M, N are cornmeasurability classes of V, then PM = PN . Thus let P = PM for some cornmeasurability class M of 97. Define CJI on %? as follows: if x is in the commeasurability class M of F then v(x) = ~~(a) w h ere a is the N equivalence class such that x E a.
Then it can be shown that (v, P, F j is a representation for @. If (4, Q, 9) is another representation for @, then by using Theorem 2.2 it can be shown that P = Q and for all x in F and all y in 9, if x G y then y(x) = v(y) . $J(x). 1 THEOREM 2.4. Let (X, CC?",%?', 9, 2') be a gum&g structure and u, v be arbitrary elements of %?. Then there is an additive probability function P on d and a function v from V into the positive reals such that q~(u) = 1 and for all f, g in 9, f2'g iff Wy(f )) 3 &k(g)).
Furthermore, if Q is another additive probability function on t" and z,b is another function from V into the positive reals such that $(v) = 1 and for all f, g in 9,
fk'g iff W$(f )) 3 W!(g)),
then P = Q and q~ = v(v)+.
Proof. Define 2 on W x 8 as follows: for each x, y E CG and each A, B E 8, 65 4 22 (Y, B) iff fAz 2' fBY.
Then it is easy to show that %Y = (X, 6, V, 2) IS an Archimedean, distributive utility-uncertainty trade-off structure. By Theorem 2.2 let (c+J, P, u) be a distributive representation for 4Y. Then for each x, y in V and each A, B in &, Thus we have shown that for all x, y E G? and all A, B E 8,
(1) fAz 2' fBy iff Ep(g)(fAX)) > EpMfBY)).
Let g be an arbitrary element of 9 and x1 ,..., x, , A, ,..., A, be such that and for i, j < n, if i f j then xi i xj and Ai n Aj = ,ES . Let x be the maximal element of b% ,..., xn} with respect to the 2' ordering, i.e., x = xi for some j < n and Structures similar to utility-uncertainty trade-off structures have been experimentally studied in Tversky [ 19671. Lexicographic orderings and cornmeasurability classes have been used in Narens [1974a] to give representations for non-Archimedean extensive structures. A representation theorem for qualitative probability without an Archimedean axiom is given in Narens [1974b] .
The concept of distributivity presented here seems to play a very important role in measurement theory. This will be more deeply investigated in Narens 
